

WRTA Autonomous Bus Program

Harsh Braking Event — March 10, 2026

Technical Incident Summary

Incident Summary

On March 10, 2026, a harsh braking event on a WRTA ADAS bus resulted in a passenger injury (bumped nose) at approximately 9:26 AM on Wick Ave in Youngstown, OH. Investigation confirmed the ADAS system was not responsible. The last ADAS mission had ended at 9:24 AM — roughly 2 minutes before the incident — meaning the brake motor controller had no ADAS authority and the bus was under full manual control by the operator.

Quick Facts

Date	March 10, 2026
Time	Approximately 9:26 AM
Location	Wick Ave between W Scott St. and University Plaza, Youngstown, OH
Operator	WRTA supervisor/trainer
System Mode	No active mission — manual operation
Last Mission End	9:24:05 AM (operator-terminated)
Passenger Injury	One passenger (young woman) bumped nose

Key Findings

- No mission log exists for the time of the incident. The system only generates logs when a mission is active. The last mission ended at 9:24:05 AM, approximately 2 minutes before the incident.
- Both the onboard MAX system and the OVID tablet — two independent systems on two separate computers — confirm no mission was active at the time of the incident.
- Because no mission was active, the Auto/Manual button was necessarily in the manual position and the brake motor controller had no autonomous brake authority. Nothing within the TONY software or equipment could have applied the brakes.
- Timing analysis shows a ~3x discrepancy between the log's movement-to-stop interval (36 seconds) and the video footage (12 seconds), ruling out any correlation.
- GPS distance analysis confirms the deceleration events in log 09-22-32_RC occurred ~38 meters away from the incident location, further confirming they are unrelated.
- Operator believed the ADAS mission was still running at the time of the incident. This is inconsistent with both system logs, which confirm the mission had ended at 9:24:05 AM.
- All 9 mission logs from March 10 have been collected and verified.

Technical Context

ADAS Mission State

The brake motor controller continuously monitors the auto_en signal controlled by the Auto/Manual button. When no mission is active, the button must be in manual position, and ADAS cannot engage. The system generates logs only when a mission is active (PLAY button pressed on OVID tablet). No log coverage exists for the incident period.

Dual-System Corroboration

The MAX onboard log system and OVID tablet are two independent systems running on two separate computers. Both independently confirm that the last mission ended at 9:24:05 AM and no mission was active at 9:26 AM when the incident occurred. The OVID log shows PROXY STATUS: DEAD < ALIVE at 9:24:06 AM, indicating the onboard proxy went offline at mission end.

Action Items Status

Action Item	Status	Notes
Complete Log Verification	CLOSED	All 9 logs confirmed collected.
Driver Interview	CLOSED	Call with Operator conducted March 30, 2026.
Video Audio Review	CLOSED	Reviewed.
Brake Motor Behavior Clarification	CLOSED	Confirmed: no ADAS brake authority when no mission active.
Proxy / NTRIP Log Review	CLOSED	Logs uploaded to shared Google Drive and reviewed.