

Toyota Motor North America, Inc.

Vehicle Safety & Compliance
Liaison Office
Mail Stop: W4-2D
6565 Headquarters Drive
Plano, TX 75024

October 14, 2026

DEFECT INFORMATION REPORT

1. Vehicle Manufacturer Name:

Toyota Motor Corporation ["TMC"]
1, Toyota-cho, Toyota-city, Aichi-pref., 471-8571, Japan

Affiliated U.S. Sales Company:

Toyota Motor North America, Inc. ["TMNA"]
6565 Headquarters Drive, Plano, TX 75024

Manufacturer of the resin fuel tube:

FTS Co., Ltd.
2-26 Kounosucho, Toyota, Aichi 471-8510, Japan

Phone: +81-565-29-2211

Country of Origin: Japan

Manufacturer of the main metal fuel tube:

Usui Co., Ltd.
131-2, Nagasawa, Shimizu, Sunto District, Shizuoka 411-8610, Japan

+81-559-72-2111

Country of Origin: Japan

2. Identification of Involved Vehicles and Affected Components:

Based on production records, we have determined the involved vehicle population to be the vehicles listed in the table below.

Make/Car Line	Model Year	Manufacturer	Production Period
Toyota / Land Cruiser	2024-2027	TMC	November 29, 2023 through October 1, 2026

Applicability	Part Number	Part Name	Component Description
MY2024-2027 Toyota / Land Cruiser	77209-60820	Tube Sub-Assy, Fuel Tank Main	Resin Fuel Tube
	77251-60D10	Tube, Fuel Main, No.1	Main Metal Fuel Tube

Note: (1) Although the involved vehicles are within the above production period range, not all vehicles in this range were sold in the U.S.

(2) This recall applies to this specific fuel tube connection on the subject vehicles. The cause and the circumstances under which this issue could occur at this connection on the subject vehicles have not been confirmed. However, other vehicles are not equipped with the same combination of components at this fuel tube connection.

3. Total Number of Vehicles Potentially Involved:

2024 Toyota Land Cruiser : 25,041
2025 Toyota Land Cruiser : 41,955
2026 Toyota Land Cruiser : 21,274
2027 Toyota Land Cruiser : 17,524
Total : 105,794

4. Percentage of Vehicles Estimated to Actually Contain the Defect:

Unknown. Toyota is unable to provide an estimate of the percentage of vehicles to actually contain the defect. The cause and the circumstances under which this issue could occur at this connection on the subject vehicles have not been confirmed. However, as the NHTSA manufacturer portal requires an integer value be entered, Toyota has entered the value “1” in response to this question in the portal. For the purpose of this report, “1” means “unknown”.

5. Description of Problem:

The subject vehicles have a resin fuel tube on the fuel tank that connects to a main metal fuel tube to deliver fuel from the fuel tank to the engine. The connection between the resin fuel tube and the main metal fuel tube could disconnect if the retaining clip on the connector is lifted. If the fuel tubes disconnect at this connection, fuel may continue to leak until the engine in the hybrid system shuts off. A fuel leak in the presence of an ignition source can increase the risk of a fire.

6. Chronology of Principal Events:

Mid July 2024 – November 2024

Toyota began receiving field reports for fuel leak on the subject vehicles. In these cases, the dealer technicians found the retainer clip on the subject fuel connection lifted or missing. The dealers either resealed and reinstalled the connector or replaced the resin fuel tube.

To investigate the reason that the retainer clips were unseated on these vehicles, Toyota investigated the production process. Toyota also reviewed the production history and post fuel tube assembly CCTV footage for some of the field report vehicles. Toyota did not identify any issues in production that could be related to this issue. The reviewed footage showed the retainer clip at this connection was correctly seated at the time of production in those vehicles. Additionally, the plants reviewed the existing installation and inspection procedures and work instructions. The suppliers also reviewed production sampling inspection data and confirmed dimensions of those samples were within specification. One of the manufacturing plants also implemented an additional visual and tactile check as an extra precaution.

Two recovered resin fuel tubes with the connector from an overseas market were examined by the supplier. The parts met dimensional specification and passed pressure resistance test and air tightness tests. The supplier observed markings on the connectors. They suspected one could be caused if the connection was disconnected with some tool after the vehicle was manufactured and the other showed markings consistent with prior supplier testing where fuel tubes were pulled apart with the connector in an unlocked state (lifted retainer clip).

May 2025 – August 2025

Toyota recovered parts from the U.S. market. Toyota reviewed the production history for these vehicles and found no relevant production process deviations such as rework, etc. The suppliers of the resin fuel tube and main metal fuel tube examined the recovered fuel tubes all parts were within dimensional specification. The resin tube supplier confirmed that these recovered parts passed the pressure resistance test. On these parts, the supplier observed markings on the retainer clip consistent with the aforementioned testing where fuel tubes were pulled apart with the connector lifted.

To investigate the state of the retainer clip on in-service vehicles, Toyota inspected approximately 200 field vehicles where no connector disconnect has been alleged (various production dates, mileage, and geographic region) and observed all connectors were properly secured.

September 2025 – October 2025

To further investigate the robustness of this connection, Toyota tested this connection using physical tests. A pull strength evaluation was conducted on newly manufactured fuel tubes with a properly secured connector. In these tests, the subject fuel tubes and connector were subject to longitudinal pull until failure—in which connector housing broke prior to any disconnect (indicating that the properly installed connector does not separate).

In addition, Toyota conducted a series of vibration and pressure tests on these fuel tubes connected using this connector. The vibration tests exposed the connection to a constant acceleration at the resonant frequency of this connector. The pressure test exposed the connection beyond the maximum pressure of the fuel pump. A combined vibration and pressure test was also conducted. In all these tests, a properly installed connector would not separate. Driving tests were also performed through standing water at various depths and speeds, and no disconnects of a properly secured connector occurred. Only in tests where the retainer clip was intentionally not correctly seated could a disconnect occur.

In addition, Toyota evaluated the fire risk on the vehicle if this connection does disconnect. Toyota reviewed the temperatures of the nearby components and the temperatures were below the ignition temperature of fuel.

In response to an inquiry from an overseas government agency, Toyota presented the status of the ongoing investigation in October 2025 and explained that no defect had been identified. The testing and investigation up to this point showed that the connection between these fuel tubes was being correctly installed at the manufacturing plants and that the connection does not separate when it is correctly installed. Based on the retainer clip markings observed on the recovery parts, Toyota suspected the clips were lifted after manufacturing, and the clip was not reinstalled correctly.

May 2026 – September 2026

After receiving additional reports (including subject vehicles with newer production dates), Toyota conducted additional analyses on this issue. This included further testing to understand the potential consequences if this connector were to disconnect during driving. Toyota tested the subject vehicle by shutting off the fuel pump while driving on a test course. In this testing, warnings displayed when the fuel pump stopped as well as when the internal combustion subsequently engine shut off. The vehicle then entered EV drive mode, which continued with reduced drive power until the HV battery depleted.

In mid-August 2026, in response to an inquiry from NHTSA, Toyota presented the status of the ongoing investigation.

To try to identify how the retainer clip at this connection could become lifted and allow the connection to disconnect, Toyota reviewed additional vehicle manufacturing, supplier, and logistics processes, work instructions, and records. None provided information on what could cause the retainer clip to become lifted. Toyota conducted additional physical testing on this connection, specifically to try to unseat the retainer clip. One test directed compressed air the connector and another used a pressure washer. The retainer clip could not become unseated in these tests.

To continue the prior investigation into the state of the retainer clip on in-service vehicles, Toyota inspected an additional approximately 400 field vehicles (various production dates, mileage, and geographic region) where no connector disconnect had been alleged and no disconnects or leaks were identified. Only one vehicle was identified with a lifted retainer clip (however the connection was still connected). Toyota reviewed the service and production history and could not identify a cause for the lifted retainer clip.

To further assess what could occur if this fuel tube connection does become disconnected, Toyota conducted a static test to evaluate the fuel spray pattern. Toyota observed that the fuel spray could not reach components that could ignite the fuel. Toyota also did not find fuel pooling on any surrounding components. Toyota also evaluated the potential fuel leak volume by testing connections on a static vehicle that were improperly installed in different ways. When the connection was intentionally disconnected, the fuel pump continued to run until the engine in the hybrid system shut off and the system leaked multiple gallons of fuel.

In late September 2026, Toyota presented an update of the status of the ongoing investigation items to NHTSA.

October 8, 2026

Based on the results of the above fuel leak volume evaluation and the number of field cases, Toyota decided to conduct a voluntary safety recall campaign—even though cause and the circumstances under which this issue could occur at this connection on the subject vehicles have not been confirmed. Toyota has not identified a defect in the design of the connection or the manufacturing process.

As of October 6, 2026, based on a diligent review of records, Toyota's best engineering judgment is that there are 23 Toyota Field Technical Reports and 64 warranty claims that have been received from U.S. sources that relate or may relate to this condition and which were considered in the decision to submit this report.

7. Description of Corrective Repair Action:

All known owners of the subject vehicles will be notified to return their vehicles to a Toyota dealer. Dealers will inspect the connection and install a supplemental clamp at this connection to prevent it from disconnecting or, if necessary, replace the resin fuel tube and install the clamp.

Reimbursement Plan for pre-notification remedies

The owner letter will instruct vehicle owners who have paid to have this condition remedied prior to this campaign to seek reimbursement pursuant to Toyota's General Reimbursement Plan.

8. Recall Schedule:

Notifications to owners of the affected vehicles will occur by December 13, 2026. A copy of the draft owner notification will be submitted as soon as it is available.

9. Distributor/Dealer Notification Schedule:

Notifications to distributors/dealers will be sent on October 14, 2026. Copies of dealer communications will be submitted as they are issued.

10. Manufacturer's Campaign Number:

Interim / Remedy: 26TB23 / 26TA23